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Abstract 
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) 
along two dimensions. First, we formulate and solve an explicit model of wage-setting in the 
presence of worker resistance to nominal wage cuts - something that has previously been 
considered intractable. In particular, we show that this resistance renders wage increases 
(partially) irreversible. Second, using this model, we can explain why previous estimates of 
the macroeconomic effects of DNWR have been so weak despite remarkably robust 
microeconomic evidence. In particular, we show that previous studies have neglected the 
possibility that DNWR can lead to a compression of wage increases as well as decreases. 
Thus, the literature may have been overstating the costs of DNWR to firms. Using micro-data 
for the US and Great Britain, we find robust evidence in support of the predictions of the 
model. In the light of this evidence, we conclude that increased wage pressure due to DNWR 
may not be as large as previously envisaged, but that the data is nevertheless consistent with a 
model in which workers resist nominal wage cuts. 
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1 Introduction
The existence of rigidities in nominal wages (and prices) is a cornerstone of macroeconomic
theory. Such rigidities act as the key theoretical motivation for the existence of a trade-o¤
between ination and unemployment in the form of the Phillips curve, and are thus of critical
importance to the conduct and e¢ cacy of macroeconomic policy.
A recent urry of empirically oriented research has used micro-data to address the question
of whether such nominal rigidity exists. In particular, this research details some striking char-
acteristics of the distribution of nominal wage changes at the individual level. These include
the existence of a mass point at zero nominal wage change and an asymmetry in the form of
a decit of nominal wage cuts, which are taken together as evidence for downward nominal
wage rigidity (henceforth DNWR). Such evidence has been found in numerous datasets span-
ning a vast number of developed economies (for a survey see Kramarz, 2001, and the references
therein). However, a number of issues remain unresolved in the light of this research.
An important question relates to evidence for the expected macroeconomic e¤ects of DNWR.
In particular, a number of studies have shown that the above results predict the existence of
a convex, long run Phillips curve (Akerlof, Dickens & Perry, 1996). Intuitively, low ination
implies that reductions in real labour costs can only be e¤ected through nominal wage cuts. If
rms are prevented from cutting nominal wages, then their only recourse is to layo¤ workers,
leading to increased unemployment. Thus, when ination is low, increased ination can relax
the constraint of DNWR on wage-setting for a signicant fraction of rms, and thereby reduce
unemployment. This result has been of particular interest in recent years due to the adoption
of ination targeting by many monetary authorities. In particular, the existence of a long-
run Phillips curve implies that implementing a low ination target could result in a persistent
increase in unemployment.
Much of the research on DNWR addresses precisely this issue. A typical reference is the
analysis of Card & Hyslop (1997) for the US. Their micro-level analysis nds strong evidence
that nominal wage cuts are restricted when ination is low, and they conclude that the existence
of DNWR leads to an increase in average real wage growth of up to 1% per annum. Card &
Hyslop then assess whether the predictions of this micro-level evidence are corroborated by
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evidence at a higher level of aggregation. In contrast to their micro-level results, Card &
Hyslops state-level results are much weaker. In particular, whilst they nd some evidence
for the existence of a Phillips curve trade-o¤, they obtain estimates that are too imprecise
to conclude that this trade-o¤ is stronger in periods of low ination1. Moreover, informal
observation of the recent incidence of low ination together with low unemployment in the US
and UK conrms the weakness of this prediction at the most basic level. Thus, there exists a
puzzle: if the micro-level evidence for DNWR is so robust, why is the analogous macro-level
evidence so fragile?
We argue that we can make progress in resolving this issue via a more careful consideration of
the theoretical underpinnings of DNWR. In particular, we present a model of DNWR informed
by recent evidence that wage-setters and negotiators are reluctant to cut the nominal wages
of workers (see Bewley, 1999, and the survey in Howitt, 2002). In particular, by interviewing
over 300 managers, pay professionals, labour leaders etc., Bewley nds that the most common
explanation provided for this reluctance is the belief that nominal wage cuts damage worker
morale. Moreover, there is additional evidence that agents are subject to money illusion (Shar,
Diamond & Tversky, 1997). In particular, these studies show that agents in di¤erent economic
settings exhibit signicant aversion to nominal losses what we will term nominal loss aversion.
A typical nding is that respondents believe it much more acceptable to receive a 5% nominal
wage increase when ination is 12%, than a 7% wage cut when there is no ination (Kahneman,
Knetsch & Thaler, 1986). This is corroborated by Genesove & Mayer (2001) who nd evidence
from real-estate data that condominium owners were reluctant to sell at a price below that they
originally paid, even though they were typically moving locally, and hence were buying in the
same market. Thus, nominal loss aversion applied to wage cuts can provide a key to explaining
the existence of DNWR.
The need for an explicit model of wage-setting in the presence of worker resistance to wage
cuts has been noted in the previous literature on money illusion, as well as by labour economists
studying the distribution of wage changes:
Plausibly, the relationship [between wages and e¤ort] is not continuous: there is
1Weak macroeconomic e¤ects have also been found by Lebow, Saks & Wilson (1999) for the US, and by Nickell
& Quintini (2003) and Smith (2004) for the UK. Indeed, Lebow, Saks & Wilson coined the term micro-macro
puzzle for the observed tension between micro- and macro-level estimates.
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a discontinuity coming from nominal wage cuts.... A central issue is how to model
such a discontinuity. Shar, Diamond & Tversky (1997), p.371.
[I]t is surprising to us that there is no rigorous treatment in the literature of
how forward looking rms should set wages when it is costly to cut nominal wages.
Altonji & Devereux (2000), p.423 note 7.
We address both these issues and show that a key insight into the implications of these behavioral
models is that nominal wage increases become partially irreversible. In particular, consider
a rm that raises the wage today, but reverses the wage increase by cutting the wage by an
equal amount tomorrow. When workers resist wage cuts, the net e¤ect on productivity will
be negative: todays wage increase will raise productivity, but tomorrows wage cut will reduce
productivity by a greater amount. Thus, reversals of wage increases are costly to rms. In this
sense we can think of there being an asymmetric adjustment cost to changing nominal wages.
Models of asymmetric adjustment costs have been widely studied in the investment (Dixit
& Pindyck, 1994) and labour demand (Bentolila & Bertola, 1990) literatures, typically in the
form of continuous time models with shocks following Brownian motions. In contrast, we
formulate and solve our model of partial irreversibility in discrete time2. This is done for a
number of reasons. First, since data are reported in discrete intervals, this method allows us to
align theoretical and empirical concepts more naturally. Moreover, many wage contracts are
renegotiated on an annual basis, which is more consistent with a discrete-time setup. Finally,
when considering worker resistance to wage cuts, the time horizon over which workers evaluate
a wage cut becomes important3. Plausibly, workers do not evaluate wage changes continually,
but rather at discrete intervals, which again lends itself more to a discrete-time model. Whilst
modelling these features in discrete time has to date been considered signicantly less tractable
than corresponding Brownian models, we develop a comparatively tractable solution method4.
The solution to this behavioralmodel equips us with a number of predictions that can
potentially reconcile the two strands of evidence mentioned above. We show that a key limi-
2Partial irreversibility of investment decisions has been studied in a continuous time Brownian framework by
Abel & Eberly (1996).
3This point has been made by Benartzi & Thaler (1995) in the context of loss aversion over asset returns.
4An additional benet of a discrete-time solution, though not pursued here, is that it allows one to relax
assumptions as to the distribution of shocks. In particular, it can be shown that a Brownian motion is the
continuous-time analogue to a Gaussian random walk (see Dixit, 1993). A discrete-time framework allows one
to use non-Gaussian shocks, as well as more generalised persistence assumptions in a more comfortable way. We
leave this as a possibility for future research.
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tation in the previous empirical literature is that it assumes (implicitly or otherwise) that the
existence of DNWR has no e¤ect on the upper tail of the wage change distribution. In par-
ticular, this is a key identifying assumption in Card & Hyslop (1997), which leads them to use
the observed upper tail of the distribution of wage changes to infer the properties of the lower
tail in the absence of DNWR. The predictions of our model show that this is misguided5. In
particular, the upper tail of wage changes will be compressed for two related reasons. First,
we show that rms may actively reduce the nominal wage paid when they increase the wage
relative to a counterfactualworld without DNWR what we will term active compression.
In the behavioral model, this results because raising the wage today increases the likelihood of
having to cut the wage, at a cost, in the future. Second, the model shows that, even if rms do
not actively compress nominal wage increases, the upper tail of the wage change distribution
will still be compressed relative to the counterfactual with no DNWR. This is because DNWR
raises the general level of wages in the economy, and thus rms do not have to raise wages as
often or as much to obtain their desired wage level. In particular, we show that this process
occurs as a result of a steady state requirement that average wages and productivity grow at
the same constant rate in the long run. We refer to this process as latent compression. Thus,
by neglecting these e¤ects, previous studies have potentially overstated the increase in wage
growth due to DNWR. In this way, we can potentially reconcile the micro- and macro-level
evidence on DNWR found in the previous empirical literature.
In the light of this, we seek evidence for these predictions using micro-data for the US and
Great Britain. We nd signicant evidence that the upper tail of the wage change distribution
exhibits a compression of wage increases that is related to DNWR. In particular, we nd that
this limits the estimated increase in real wage growth due to DNWR from around 11.5% to no
more than 0.3%. We show that this is because rms can saveat least 75% of the increase
in wage growth due to restricted wage cuts by reducing nominal wage increases. This might go
some way to explaining why the aggregate e¤ects of DNWR are often found to be modest.
As an additional test of the implications of the model of DNWR presented, we show that
the model also implies that increased rates of turnover should mitigate the necessity for rms
5This is not to say that Card & Hyslop (1997) is any more subject to this criticism than other previous
empirical work on DNWR. Rather, it is the clarity of the statement of identifying assumptions in that paper
that allows a particularly clean point of contrast with the implications of the model and results of this paper.
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to restrict wage increases. This occurs because higher turnover reduces the probability that a
given worker will stay in the rm an additional period, and thus renders the rm more myopic.
Thus rms do not need to compress wage increases as a precaution against future costly wage
cuts to the same extent. We again nd robust evidence for this hypothesis using the NESPD
data. This reinforces the claim that a model of DNWR based on worker resistance to nominal
wage cuts is a useful way of understanding the empirical properties of wage setting.
In the light of this evidence, we conclude that the macro e¤ects of DNWR may not be as
large as previously envisaged, and thus may not provide such a strong argument against the
adoption of a low ination target. However, the data is nevertheless consistent with a model in
which workers resist nominal wage cuts and may thereby imply something fundamental about
the nature of human behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an explicit behavioral model
of wage-setting in the presence of worker resistance to nominal wage cuts; section 3 eshes out
some of the predictions of these models that we can take to the data; section 4 presents our
empirical methodology and the results obtained; section 5 discusses some remaining issues for
future work; and section 6 concludes. Where possible, we omit technical details from the main
text, and relegate them to the appendices6.
2 A Behavioral Model of DNWR
In this section we present an explicit model of downward nominal wage rigidity based on the
observations detailed in the empirical literatures mentioned above. In particular, we study the
optimal nominal wage policies of worker-rm pairs for whom the productivity of the worker
(denoted e) depends upon the wage as follows:
e = ln
!
b

+ c ln

W
W 1

1  (1)
where W is the nominal wage, W 1 the lagged nominal wage, 1  an indicator for a nominal
wage cut, !  W=P the real wage, and b a measure of real unemployment benets (which we
6 In addition, we omit some of the more straightforward proofs to save space  these are available from the
author on request.
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assume to be constant over time). The parameter c > 0 varies the productivity cost to the rm
of a nominal wage cut.
The motivation for this e¤ort function is as follows. We assume that worker e¤ort depends
positively on the di¤erence between the level of the real wage, !, and real unemployment
benets, b. This captures the idea that, the higher the workers real standard of living from
being in work relative to unemployment, the harder that worker will work. In addition, we
model the productivity loss due to nominal wage cuts by assuming that e¤ort is falling in the
geometric nominal wage cut. Our reasoning for this is that the most obvious alternative that
it is the absolute value of the cut in the nominal wage that reduces e¤ort is implausible in the
following sense. It implies that a wage cut of a cent will cause the same loss in e¤ort whether
last periods nominal wage is $1 or $1,000,000. This is clearly extreme, so we employ the more
sensible concept that it is the percentage cut in the nominal wage that a¤ects e¤ort.
The qualitative features of this e¤ort function are illustrated in Figure 1. Clearly, there is a
kink at W = W 1 reecting the existence of DNWR. In particular, the marginal productivity
loss of a nominal wage cut exceeds the marginal productivity gain of a nominal wage increase:
@e=@W jW"W 1
@e=@W jW#W 1
= 1 + c > 1 (2)
This characteristic is what makes nominal wage increases (partially) irreversible a nominal
wage increase can only be reversed at an additional marginal cost of c. Clearly, the parameter
c is what drives this feature of the model.
The e¤ort function, (1), can be interpreted as a very simple way of capturing the basic essence
of the motivations for DNWR mentioned in the literature. It is essentially a parametric form of
e¤ort functions in the spirit of the fair-wage e¤ort hypothesis expounded by Solow (1979) and
Akerlof & Yellen (1988), with an additional term reecting the impact of nominal wage cuts on
e¤ort as envisaged in the quote from Shar, Diamond & Tversky (1997) in the introduction.
Bewley (1999) also advocates such a characterization7:
7However, such is the intricacy of Bewleys study, he would probably consider (1) a simplication, not least
for its neglect of emphasis on morale as distinct from productivity, and of the internal wage structure of rms as
a source of wage rigidity. We argue that it is a useful simplication as it provides key qualitative insights into
the implied dynamics of wage-setting under more nuanced theories of morale.
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The only one of the many theories of wage rigidity that seems reasonable is the
morale theory of Solow...Bewley (1999), p.423.
The [Solow] theory...errs to the extent that it attaches importance to wage levels
rather than to the negative impact of wage cuts.Bewley (1999), p.415.
In addition, an e¤ort function with these properties can be derived from a compensating di¤er-
entials model where worker utility exhibits nominal loss aversion. The basic intuition for this
is that, if workers dislike nominal losses and the rm wishes to cut the nominal wage, then the
rm must compensate the worker in the form of lower on-the-job e¤ort in order to prevent the
worker from quitting. Thus, in this sense, (1) can be considered a reduced form of a model in
which workers dislike nominal loss. The goal of this paper is not to highlight the nuances of
emphasis which do indeed exist between these behavioral foundations, but rather to show
that they share a common, theoretically important, qualitative implication as to the nature of
a rms wage-setting choice. This is intended as a start towards richer models of these phe-
nomena, and to this end aims to unify rather than to di¤erentiate. We discuss the implications
of alternative functional forms for the e¤ort function in section 5.
The most comparable previous attempt at explicitly modelling the behavioral foundation to
DNWR is that of Akerlof, Dickens & Perry (1996). However, Akerlof et al. present a model in
which rms have no operational discretion over wage-setting wages are given by a wage-setting
relationship which rms take as exogenous, and which dictates that nominal wages can never
fall. Thus, the implicit assumption in their model is that rms do not cut wages because, if
they did, all of their workers would quit. In this way, their model e¤ectively short-circuits
any endogenous reaction on behalf of rms to the existence of DNWR. The model presented
in this paper di¤ers critically in that rms do have a non-trivial wage-setting decision: rms
can cut nominal wages if they wish, but it will have a strong adverse e¤ect on productivity at
the margin. We argue that this is a more desirable setup. In the rst instance, it accords
better with the evidence that rms restrict wage cuts due to concerns over morale within the
rm, rather than because the external labour market dictates it (Bewley, 1999). Secondly, we
will see that a model with wage discretion captures an important characteristic of the available
data: that wage increases are also compressed when DNWR binds.
The Wage Setting Problem
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We consider a discrete-time, innite-horizon model in which price-taking worker-rm pairs
choose the nominal wage Wt at each date t to maximize the expected discounted value of
prots. For simplicity, we assume that each worker-rms production function is given by a  e,
where a is a real technology shock that is idiosyncratic to the worker-rm match, is observed
contemporaneously, and acts as the source of uncertainty in the model. Thus, dening  2 [0; 1)
as the discount factor of the rm, the typical rms decision problem is given by:
max
fWtg
Et
" 1X
s=t
s t fases   !sg
#
(3)
where es = ln
!s
b

+ c ln

Ws
Ws 1

1 s
It turns out in what follows that it is convenient to re-express the rms prot stream in constant
date t prices. To this end, we multiply through by Pt, which we dene as the competitive price
level at date t, and assume that it evolves according to Pt = (1 + )Pt 1, where  is the rate of
ination. Finally, dening the nominal counterparts, At  Ptat and Bt  Ptb and substituting
for et, we obtain the following optimization problem for the rm:
max
fWtg
Et
" 1X
s=t


1 + 
s t
As

ln

Ws
Bs

+ c ln

Ws
Ws 1

1 s

 Ws
#
(4)
We assume that the nominal shock has support [0;1) and that its evolution can be described
by the cumulative density function F (A0jA). Thus, rewriting the problem in recursive form8
we have9:
v (W 1; A) = max
W

A

ln

W
B

+ c ln

W
W 1

1 

 W + 
1 + 
Z
v
 
W;A0

dF
 
A0jA
(5)
(5) is the basic problem that we will attempt to solve in what follows10. Before we begin,
though, we rst present an intuitive outline of the type of results we might expect.
8We adopt the convention of denoting lagged values by a subscript,  1, and forward values by a prime, 0.
9 In addition, we make the standard assumption that the measure dF (A0jA) satises the Feller property, so
that the mapping dened by (5) preserves continuity of the value function. A su¢ cient condition for this is that
A is governed by the stochastic di¤erence equation, A0 = g (A; "0), where g is a continuous function and "0 is an
i.i.d. innovation (see Stokey & Lucas, 1989, pp.237, 261262). We maintain this assumption throughout the
paper.
10There is an issue that, for su¢ ciently low values of the wage, e¤ort is potentially negative. However,
accounting for such a non-negativity constraint signicantly complicates the solution to the model without much
gain in relevance. We maintain the assumption that the level of benets is su¢ ciently low relative to wages as
to allow almost all rms to ignore this constraint.
9
2.1 Some Intuition for the Behavioral Model
As the theory presented in the forthcoming sections can seem analytically complicated, in this
section we present the economic intuition for each of the predictions of the model, which we
deal with in turn.
First, the model predicts that there will be a spike at zero in the distribution of nominal wage
changes across rms. This occurs because of the kink in the objective function at W = W 1.
In particular, this implies that for each rm there will be a range of values (region of inaction)
for the nominal shock, A, for which it is optimal not to change the nominal wage. Since A
is distributed across rms, there will thus exist a positive fraction of rms each period whose
realization of A lies in their region of inaction that will in turn not change their nominal wage.
Second, in the event that a rm does decide to change the nominal wage, the wage change
will be actively compressed relative to the case where there is no DNWR. That nominal wage
cuts are attenuated is straightforward to explain  as wage cuts involve a discontinuous fall
in productivity at the margin, the rm will be less willing to e¤ect them. In particular,
some small wage cuts that would have been implemented in the absence of DNWR will instead
be implemented as wage freezes. Moreover, larger counterfactual wage cuts will be reduced
in magnitude. It is slightly less obvious why nominal wage increases are also attenuated in
this way. The reason is that, in an uncertain world, increasing the wage today increases the
likelihood that you will have to cut the wage, at a cost, in the future.
A direct implication of this last prediction is that increases in the productivity cost of cutting
the nominal wage, c, will accentuate all these e¤ects. That is, a higher productivity cost due
to nominal wage cuts will widen the region of inaction, thereby increasing the mass point at
zero in the distribution of nominal wage changes, and will also render the active compression
of nominal wage changes more acute.
The nal prediction we want to emphasize at this stage is the e¤ect of increased ination
on nominal wage increases. In particular, we nd that the active compression of nominal wage
increases becomes less pronounced as ination rises. As explained earlier, this is because the
only reason rms restrict wage increases in the model is the prospect of costly nominal wage
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cuts in the future. Since higher ination reduces the probability of this occurring, rms no
longer need to worry as much about increasing the nominal wage.
2.2 The Dynamic Model
In this section we solve the full dynamic optimization problem as stated above:
v (W 1; A) = max
W

A

ln

W
B

+ c ln

W
W 1

1 

 W + 
1 + 
Z
v
 
W;A0

dF
 
A0jA
(6)
First we will present the general structure of the solution, and then we will obtain its specic
form under additional assumptions as to the distribution of shocks F ().
The basic structure of the solution to the full dynamic model is as follows. We solve the
problem by rst taking the rst-order condition with respect to W , conditional on W 6= 0:
 
1 + c1 
 A
W
  1 + 
1 + 
D (W;A) = 0; if W 6= 0 (7)
where D (W;A)  R vW (W;A0) dF (A0jA) is the marginal e¤ect of the current wage choice on
the future prots of the rm. Clearly, a key step in solving for the rms optimal wage policy
involves characterizing the properties of the function D (). However, we leave this for the
moment and note rst that the general structure of the optimal nominal wage policy is as
follows:
Proposition 1 The optimal nominal wage policy in the dynamic model is of the form:
If A > u (W 1)  Au; W > 0 until W = u 1(A)
If A < l (W 1)  Al; W < 0 until W = l 1 (A)
If A 2 [Al; Au] ; W = 0 or W =W 1
(8)
where the functions u () and l () satisfy:
u (W )
W
  1 + 
1 + 
D (W;u (W ))  0 (9)
(1 + c)
l (W )
W
  1 + 
1 + 
D (W; l (W ))  0
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The reasoning for this is very straightforward. In particular, Proposition 1 uses the condi-
tional rst-order condition (7) to dene the functions u () and l (), as in (9). These functions
determine the optimal relationship between the nominal wage, W , and the nominal shock, A,
in the event that wages are adjusted up or down respectively. The rest of the result follows
from the fact that, by virtue of the continuity and concavity of the rms objective, (5), the
optimal value of W must be a continuous function of A11.
However, to complete our characterization of the rms optimal nominal wage policy, we
need to establish the functions u (), and l (), to which we now turn. In particular, we can
see from (9) that, in order to solve for these functions, we require knowledge of the functions
D (W;u (W )) and D (W; l (W )). This is aided by Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 The function D () satises:
D (W;A) =
Z u(W )
l(W )

A0
W
  1

dF  
Z l(W )
0
c
A0
W
dF +

1 + 
Z u(W )
l(W )
D
 
W;A0

dF (10)
which is a contraction mapping in D () over the relevant range, and thus has a unique xed
point over this range.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The rst term on the RHS of (10) represents
tomorrows expected within-period marginal benet, given that W 0 is set equal to W . To see
this, note that the rm will freeze tomorrows wage if A0 2 [A0l  l (W ) ; A0u  u (W )], and that
in this event a wage level ofW today will generate a within-period marginal benet of
h
A0
W   1
i
.
Similarly, the second term on the RHS of (10) represents tomorrows expected marginal cost,
given that the rm cuts the nominal wage tomorrow. Finally, the last term on the RHS of (10)
accounts for the fact that, in the event that tomorrows wage is frozen, the marginal e¤ects of
W persist into the future in a recursive fashion. It is this recursive property that provides us
with the key to determining the function D ().
For the purposes of the present paper, we use a specic form for F (). In particular, we
11This follows from the Theorem of the Maximum (see e.g. Stokey & Lucas, 1989, pp. 62-63).
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imagine that real shocks, a, evolve according to the following geometric random walk:
ln a0 = ln a  1
2
2 + "0 (11)
"0  N  0; 2
Given that prices are assumed to evolve according to P 0 = (1 + )P , we obtain the following
process for nominal shocks, A:
lnA0 = ln (1 + ) + lnA  1
2
2 + "0 (12)
Note that this implies that E (A0jA) = (1 + )A. We can then use this information to determine
the full solution as follows. First, we solve for the functions D (W;u (W )) and D (W; l (W ))
using equation (10), via the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. Then, given these, we obtain
the solutions for u (W ) and l (W ) using the equations in (9). Following this method yields
Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 If nominal shocks evolve according to the geometric random walk, (12), the
functions u () and l () are of the form:
u (W ) = u W (13)
l (W ) = l W
where u and l are given constants that depend upon the parameters of the model, fc; ; ; g.
Thus, the optimal nominal wage policy takes the following piecewise linear form:
If A > u W 1  Au; W > 0 until W = A=u
If A < l W 1  Al; W < 0 until W = A=l
If A 2 [Al; Au] ; W = 0 or W =W 1
(14)
2.3 Some Special Cases
In order to get a feeling for how the model works, we present solutions to special cases of the
above full dynamic model. In particular, we consider two cases: where nominal wage increases
are fully reversible (c = 0), and the case where nominal increases are partially irreversible
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(c > 0), but where rms are myopic ( = 0).
The Case where c = 0
Note that the assumption that c = 0 removes any dynamic considerations from the rms wage-
setting choice by removing the dependence of e¤ort on last periods wage. In this case, it is
straightforward to show that the solution for this problem is:
W = A =) W = A (15)
In this case, wage changes fully reect changes in productivity, and the distribution of nominal
wage changes across rms will be exactly the same as the distribution of changes in the nominal
shock. We term this result the counterfactual solution.
The Case where  = 0
This is another static special case of (5), but retains the productivity cost of cutting the nominal
wage, c. In this case the rms rst-order condition will be given by:
 
1 + c1 
 A
W
  1 = 0, if W 6= 0 (16)
which, using Proposition 1, implies the following optimal nominal wage policy:
If A > W 1; W > 0 until W = A
If A < W 11+c ; W < 0 until W = (1 + c)A
If A 2
h
W 1
1+c ;W 1
i
; W = 0 or W =W 1
(17)
Note that this wage policy is the special case of (14) where u = 1 and l = 11+c . By comparing
this wage policy to the case where c = 0, we can see that the rm is taking counterfactual
nominal wage cuts in the interval
h
W 1
1+c ;W 1
i
and is instead implementing them as wage freezes.
Moreover, for all counterfactual wages below W 11+c , the rm is reducing the magnitude of wage
cuts by a factor 11+c . Thus nominal wage cuts are being actively compressed as a result of
DNWR.
However, the same is not true for nominal wage increases. All counterfactual wage increases
are being implemented without alteration. The reason for this is that  = 0 implies that the
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rm doesnt care about the future consequences of raising the nominal wage in the current
period. We shall see that this is in stark contrast to the general case where we allow  > 0,
to which we turn in the following section. However, it should be noted at this point that even
in this simple case the methods of Card & Hyslop (1997) and other previous studies will be
potentially biased. Whilst this special case yields no active compression of wage increases by
rms, there will still be some latent compression: since DNWR places upward pressure on the
level of wages in the past, the rm does not have to raise wages as frequently to achieve their
target wage today.
3 Predictions
This section seeks to bridge the gap between the theory presented above and the forthcom-
ing empirical section by drawing out some testable predictions of the theory. Recall that we
are interested in two potential forms of the compression of wage increases: active compression
whereby rms actually reduce the wage paid when they increase the wage; and latent compres-
sion that arises because DNWR increases the general level of wages and thus lessens the need
for rms to increase wages by as much in order to reach their desired level. We show that these
predictions have a precise interpretation in the context of the model presented above.
3.1 Active Compression
As can be seen from (14), active compression of wage changes can be related to the parameters
u and l. Numerical simulations of the model establish that u > 1 > l and that 1=l > u.12 This
is precisely in accordance with our original intuition (section 2.1). Since u > l there exists
a region of inaction for the nominal shock variable in which it is optimal not to change the
nominal wage. Moreover, because l < 1 there will be an active compression of nominal wage
cuts. This follows directly from the discontinuous fall in e¤ort following a wage cut at the
margin. In addition, u > 1 means that nominal wage increases will also be actively compressed
relative to the counterfactual solution. Recall that the intuition for this is that raising the
nominal wage today raises the likelihood that the rm will wish to cut the wage, at a cost, in
the future. Finally, the fact that 1=l > u implies that the active compression of wage increases
12Unfortunately, due to the analytical complexity of the solution, a formal proof of this result has proved
elusive.
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will not be as strong as that for wage cuts. The reason for this is that the potential costs
associated with wage increases are discounted in two ways. First, some discounting derives
from the fact that raising the wage may only increase the costs of wage cuts in the future. But,
in addition to this, the probability that these additional future costs will be realized is less than
one, leading to further discounting.
Recall that our main concern is with the characteristics of the nominal wage change distri-
bution. Using (14) it is straightforward to establish the following proposition for the form of
the log nominal wage change distribution, conditional on the lagged wage:
Proposition 4 The log nominal wage change density, conditional on the lagged wage, implied
by the behavioral model is given by:
f ( lnW jW 1) =
8>>>><>>>>:
~f ( lnW + lnujW 1) if  lnW > 0
~F (lnujW 1)  ~F (ln ljW 1) if  lnW = 0
~f ( lnW + ln ljW 1) if  lnW < 0
(18)
where ~F (jW 1) and ~f (jW 1) are the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of the counterfactual (no DNWR)
conditional log nominal wage change distribution.
Figure 2 illustrates this result. In particular, it shows that the distribution of log wage cuts
is exactly the same as the counterfactual distribution below ln l < 0, just shifted horizontally
by an amount   ln l > 0. A similar result obtains for wage increases. The residual density is
piled upto a mass point at zero wage change. Thus, the e¤ect of worker resistance to wage
cuts is to yield a conditional log wage change distribution with dual censoring from above and
below relative to the counterfactual13.
The key prediction that we will test in our empirical work is the e¤ect of the rate of ination,
, on the compression of nominal wage increases. To this end, gure 3 presents results for the
e¤ect of changes in the rate of ination on the parameter u. It is clear is that the rm will reduce
any active compression of wage increases as ination rises since u falls as  rises. The intuition
for this is that active compression of wage increases occurs only insofar as wage increases raise
13This censoring result has interesting parallels in the previous empirical literature. Altonji & Devereux (2000)
estimate an econometric model similar to (18) except that they neglect the possibility of compression of wage
increases.
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the likelihood of future costly nominal wage cuts. To see this, note that our special case in
which the rm does not care about the future ( = 0) yielded no active compression of wage
increases (u = 1). Thus, since higher ination reduces the likelihood of future costly nominal
cuts, the rm no longer needs to worry about raising the nominal wage today. A key related
result that we want to emphasize is that, as ination becomes large, u ! 1. That is, high
ination implies that wage increases cease to be actively compressed relative to a counterfactual
world without DNWR. Thus, if the behavioral model is correct, we would expect to observe
the upper tail of f ( lnW jW 1) becoming more dispersed as ination rises. This is illustrated
in Figure 4.
In the forthcoming empirical analysis, we will look at percentiles of the log wage change
distribution to get an impression of whether there is an active compression of wage increases
that is related to the rate of ination. We can use our derivations in (18) to obtain precise
predictions as to what we might expect to observe. In particular, note that the conditional
c.d.f. of nominal wage increases is given by:
F ( lnW jW 1;W > 0) = ~F ( lnW + lnujW 1) (19)
and that the nth percentile in the domain of nominal wage increases, Pn ( lnW jW 1), is
therefore given by:
Pn ( lnW jW 1) =   lnu+ ~F 1
 n
100

=   lnu+ ~Pn (20)
Thus, for all wage change percentiles in the domain of wage increases, the existence of DNWR in
the behavioral model decreases the percentile by a xed constant, lnu, relative to the counter-
factual percentile, ~Pn. Since we know from Figure 3 that u is declining in the rate of ination,
it follows that the model predicts a positive relationship between these positive percentiles and
the rate of ination. However, this is not the end of the story: the next section shows that
there are additional reasons for there to be a compression of wage increases, even in the absence
of these e¤ects.
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3.2 Latent Compression
All of the above discussion on active compression has been in terms of the nominal wage change
distribution conditional on the lagged nominal wage. The reason for this is that the lagged wage
is taken as given (is part of the state) at the time of setting the current wage, and so all theories
will yield direct implications on the conditional distribution, f ( lnW jW 1). However, most
of the previous empirical literature has concentrated on the properties of the unconditional
distribution, f ( lnW ), typically by estimating some measure of the increase in average wage
growth due to DNWR:
E ( lnW jDNWR)  E ( lnW jno DNWR) (21)
to try to gain an impression of the e¤ect of DNWR on the rmsreal labour costs. The following
proposition demonstrates that this emphasis in the previous literature may well be misleading:
Proposition 5 DNWR has no e¤ect on average wage growth in the long run for nite G  u=l.
This result can be interpreted in a number of ways. First, and closest to the form of the proof,
note that the optimal wage policy (14) implies that the di¤erence in the levels of the log wage
with and without DNWR must be bounded (between   lnu < 0 and   ln l > 0). Thus, it
follows that the rates of growth of actual and counterfactual log wages cannot be di¤erent in
the long run, as it would necessarily imply a violation of these bounds.14
An alternative interpretation for this result is that it is simply a requirement for the existence
of a steady state in which average growth rates are equal. Since productivity shocks grow on
average at a constant rate, so must wages grow at that same rate in the long run. Thus, even
the model with DNWR must comply with this simple steady state condition in the long run.
How might this result come about? First, our results above indicate that rms may actively
compress wage increases as a precaution against future costly wage cuts, thereby limiting the
wage growth increasing e¤ects of DNWR. However, this cannot be the whole story we saw
above that the active compression of wage increases will be less than that of wage cuts. In
addition, we can nd cases in which there will be no active compression of wage increases for
which Proposition 5 still applies. So there must be an additional process at work.
14A similar result has been established independently in the investment literature by Bloom (2000).
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Consider the case where  = 0. Recall that this is the case in which there is no active
compression of wage increases as rms are myopic. Figure 5 shows a simulation of the uncon-
ditional wage change distribution implied by the behavioral model in this case. We can see
from Figure 5 that, contrary to the assumption of previous studies, the upper tail of f ( lnW )
displays a compression in the presence of DNWR. Thus, the upper tail of the wage change
distribution is still compressed, even if rms do not actively compress wage increases.
This provides an additional insight into the process by which this steady state requirement
might be achieved in practice. If wage increases are not actively compressed, this means that
when rms increase the wage, they increase it to the counterfactual level, A. However, recall
that the existence of DNWR will tend to raise the general level of lagged wages in the economy,
as rms will have been constrained in cutting wages in the past. Thus, when rms increase
the wage, they do not have to increase it by as much or as often to reach the counterfactual
wage level. Thus the upper tail of f ( lnW ) will indeed still be a¤ected by the existence of
DNWR in particular, it will be less dispersed, as seen in Figure 5. We term this additional
e¤ect latent compression.
Thus, Proposition 5 has important implications with respect to the previous empirical liter-
ature. By not taking into account the compression of wage increases, previous empirical studies
could have overstated the increase in wage growth due to DNWR. To see this, consider Figure
6. This shows three simulated wage change distributions derived from the model of section
2. The bold line shows the wage change distribution with DNWR (c > 0), whereas the thick
dashed line illustrates the true counterfactual wage change density (c = 0). In addition, we
include a median symmetriccounterfactual density that is derived by imposing symmetry in
the upper tail of the distribution with DNWR (according to the method of Card & Hyslop,
1997). It can be clearly seen that, by using the median symmetric counterfactual, we obtain an
overestimate of the increase in average wage growth due to DNWR when there is a compression
of the upper tail. By neglecting this compression, previous studies could have overstated the
e¤ects of DNWR on average wage growth, which could go some way to explaining the observed
tension between the micro- and macro- level evidence on DNWR. We will examine whether
this is true in the ensuing empirical analysis.
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3.3 Turnover E¤ects
In addition to the above, the model of section 2 can also provide predictions on the e¤ect of
turnover on the distribution of wage changes. To see this, imagine that there is now some
exogenous probability that a worker will separate from the rm each period,  < 1. The e¤ect
of this is to reduce the rms real discount factor from  to , since there is now a lower
probability that the match will survive until next period. As a result, sectors in which turnover
is high (high ) will act more myopically than sectors with low turnover. In other words, high
turnover sectors should set wages more like the special case in which  = 0 (section 2.2), and
low turnover sectors should act more like the forward looking rm of section 2.3. It follows
that we should expect to see a greater active compression of wage increases in sectors with
lower turnover15. Moreover, we should also expect this e¤ect to be stronger in periods of low
ination: when ination is high, the rm does not have to worry about the future consequences
of current wage decisions, regardless of the probability that a worker will stay at the rm. We
will examine these claims in the forthcoming empirical section to which we now turn.
4 Empirical Implementation
4.1 Data
The data used in this analysis are taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the US, and the New Earnings Survey Panel
Dataset (NESPD) for Great Britain. For all datasets, the relevant wage measure used in this
study is the basic hourly wage rate for respondents aged 16 to 65. Since the CPS and PSID
are relatively well-known datasets, we only describe them briey here.
The CPS samples are taken from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) les from
1979 to 2002. We link respondents across consecutive years using a method similar to that
advocated by Madrian & Lefgren (1999)16. This method yields approximately 25,000 individual
annual wage changes each year from 19802002, although changes in sampling method yield
lower sample sizes in 198586 and 199596 (see Table 1). Unfortunately, we cannot easily
15Thanks to Marianne Bertrand for originally suggesting this idea to me.
16 In particular, rst we match individuals according to their personal identiers, as well as their month of
interview. We then employ Madrian & Lefgrens sjrjacriterion i.e. that matched observations must report
the same sex and race across years, and that the di¤erence in their age must lie in the interval [0; 2].
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di¤erentiate between job-stayers and changers using the CPS due to a lack of information on
job characteristics and tenure17. Additional problems arise in the CPS resulting from the
survey redesign in 1994. Figure 7 illustrates the dispersion of log wage changes in the CPS over
the sample period, as measured by the standard deviation, and the 90-10 and 80-20 percentile
di¤erentials. One can clearly detect a signicant rise in the dispersion of wage changes starting
in 199418. In our ensuing empirical analysis we attempt to control for this.
The PSID data are taken from the random (not poverty) samples for the years 1971 to 1992.
We use data on regular hourly pay rates for household heads to construct individual annual
wage changes. We concentrate on the wage changes of job-stayers19 by excluding workers with
tenure of strictly less than 12 months20, and additionally remove respondents who report that
they live in a foreign country, and top-coded wage data. Our PSID sample provides us with
much smaller samples than those from the CPS, with approximately 1,3002,200 individual
wage changes each year over the sample period (see Table 1).
Finally, the NESPD is an individual level panel which is collected in April of each year
running from 1975 through to 2001 for Great Britain21. It is a 1% sample of British income
tax-paying workers with a National Insurance (Social Security) number that ends in a given
pair of digits. The wage measure used is the gross hourly earnings, excluding overtime, of
job-stayers whose pay is una¤ected by absence. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the
NESPD sample. An important observation to make is that the statistics for the level of real
wage changes in 1977 are vastly lower than in all other periods in the NESPD. In particular,
the fraction of respondents reporting a real wage cut was 77:64% in 1977, but was never below
52% in any other year in the sample period (see Table 1). The reason for this is that the UK
17Card & Hyslop (1997) attempt to identify job-stayers in the CPS by restricting their analysis to those
respondents who do not change occupation year-on-year. We do not make such an attempt as it is complicated
by changes in the occupational classication over the period. However, the sample used in this paper displays
very similar properties to that of Card & Hyslop.
18This is likely to be due in particular to an increase in the fraction of imputed wage observations in the CPS
for 1994 onwards. However, it is di¢ cult to simply deleted such imputed observations from the analysis due to
large changes in the accuracy of the CPS imputation ags over the period see Hirsch & Schumacher (2004).
19 It should be noted that tenure in the PSID refers to the time spent with the same employer, except for the
years 197980 when it refers to the time spent in the same position.
20A selection issue arises when excluding job-changers. In particular, previous research has shown that dis-
placed workers often accept signicant reductions in earnings on re-employment (see Jacobson, LaLonde &
Sullivan, 1993). Thus, by concentrating on job-stayers, our results might overstate the true extent of DNWR.
However, it is also the case that much of the previous literature has focused on job-stayers, so our analysis will
be comparable to that of other studies. We leave these empirical issues for future research.
21However, much of our analysis requires the use of consistent industry and occupation coding, which we have
up to 1999 only.
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government of the time instituted an incomes policy in order to try to curb high ination. In
particular, these policies were remarkably successful in containing wage ination in late 1976
to early 1977 as a result of the cooperation of the unions (see Cairncross, 1995, pp. 220221).
Despite this, however, retail price ination remained high, thereby leading to the signicant
real wage losses that we observe in our data. As a result of this, we treat the 1977 data as an
outlier throughout the rest of our analysis.
Since the descriptive properties of DNWR in all of these datasets have been well-explored
in previous analyses Card & Hyslop (1997) for the CPS, Kahn (1997) and Altonji & Devereux
(2000) for the PSID, and Nickell & Quintini (2003) for the NESPD we do not seek to provide
a full descriptive account of DNWR. For reference, though, Tables 1 and 2 present summary
statistics for wage changes and the key variables that will be used in the forthcoming analysis.
The primary aim of the current section is rather to assess the validity of the predictions of
the model presented in section 2. However, the relative merits of the datasets used are worth
mentioning, especially since the NESPD data have not been as widely used to date.
The NESPD data for Great Britain have a number of key advantages for our purposes,
especially in comparison with the CPS and PSID samples for the US. The rst, and most
obvious, is that the NESPD provides us with comparatively very large sample sizes: we obtain
sample sizes of 6080,000 wage change observations each year. This will help us to identify
a more precise relationship between the distribution of wage changes and the rate of ination,
since we can be more condent that variation in the wage-change distribution is not driven by
errors due to lower sample sizes.
The second advantage of the NESPD data is its sample period: from 19752001. This is
particularly useful for our purposes given that we seek to use variation in the rate of ination
to gauge the impact of DNWR on wage changes, since the UK experienced signicant variation
in ination over this period relative to the US. Figure 8 displays the time-series of the leading
UK ination indicator the Retail Price Index (RPI) and the CPI-U ination rate for the US,
over the relevant periods. It can be seen that the UK ination rate varied substantially, with
rates over 20% in the 1970s down to below 2% in the 1990s. Ination in the US, on the other
hand, displays much less variation, with rates no higher than 11%. Thus, again we can expect
to be able to identify a more signicant relationship, should one exist, between the wage-change
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distribution and ination for the NESPD sample by virtue of this greater variation.
The nal key advantage of the NESPD sample is that measurement error in these data
is likely to be less of a problem relative to individually reported data of the CPS and PSID
samples. The reason for this is that the NESPD is collected from employerspayroll records,
thereby leaving less scope for error due to imperfect memory etc. (see Nickell & Quintini, 2003,
for more on this). Indeed validation studies of leading panel datasets have used matched data
from employer surveys to assess the extent of measurement error in worker reported earnings
data. In particular, Bound & Krueger (1990) and Card & Hyslop (1997) both seek to assess
the importance of measurement error in the CPS via this method.
The existence of measurement error in hourly wages has been shown in previous empirical
studies to act as a key impediment to inferring the extent of DNWR. As emphasized throughout
this analysis, the existence of a spike at zero in the distribution of nominal wage changes is a
key characteristic of DNWR. Classical measurement error in wages and hours data would yield
an understatement of the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity. To see this, note that the
addition of classical measurement error will render true wage freezes to be observed as (small)
wage changes, thereby reducing the size of the observed spike (Akerlof, Dickens & Perry, 1996).
Previous studies have also stressed that individuals may round their reported wages. This, in
contrast to classical error, would yield an overstatement of the extent of DNWR as small true
wage changes are reported as wage freezes (Smith, 2000).
Some existing studies have attempted to circumvent this problem in a number of ways.
Altonji & Devereux (1999) developed an empirical model that allows for the existence of a
Normally distributed classical measurement error. However, the main criticism of this is that
no account is taken of potential rounding. In addition, a number of studies have augmented their
analyses with data obtained from payroll records from individual establishments (see Altonji
& Devereux, 1999, and Fehr & Goette, 2003). These, on the other hand, are subject to the
criticism that any results are not representative. The relative accuracy of the NESPD allows
us to avoid these di¢ culties, and is thus an important virtue in this context22.
22 It should be noted that hourly earnings in the NESPD are derived from dividing weekly earnings by weekly
hours, thereby potentially exacerbating any underlying measurement error. However, Nickell & Quintini (2003)
have compared the accuracy of hourly wage changes in the NESPD with those obtained from a sample whose
payslip was checked in the British Household Panel Study and found remarkably similar properties in both
datasets.
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A nal note worth making in the context of our datasets is that ination stayed at persis-
tently low levels in the US and UK from 1992 onwards, with an average ination rate of 2.56%
for the US 19922002 and 2.69% for the UK 19922001. This is important, as a criticism lev-
elled at previous studies of DNWR has been that individuals will get used to receiving nominal
wage cuts when ination has remained low for some time (Gordon, 1996, and Mankiw, 1996).
Such a criticism becomes less compelling when the ination rate has stayed low for the 910
years observed in our samples for the CPS and the NESPD.
4.2 Does DNWR Increase Aggregate Wage Growth?
In order to test our hypotheses, we need a way of modelling empirically the wage change
distribution, f ( lnW ). In what follows, we will focus on the analogous real wage change
distribution counterparts to these. Note that this does not alter any substantive aspects of
the analysis, since these are exactly the same shaped distributions, just shifted to the left by
a constant (approximately equal to the rate of ination)23. However, focusing on these does
allow greater ease of comparison across years with di¤erent ination rates.
The method we apply to our two empirical questions will turn out to be very similar. To
start with, then, we motivate our preferred method in the context of trying to understand the
impact of DNWR on the unconditional distribution of log wage changes, f ( lnW ). Let us
begin by considering some naive approaches. First, we might think of simply looking at the
di¤erences between the wage change distributions in high ination periods and low ination
periods to see if the predictions of section 3.1 are conrmed at this basic level. To this end,
gures 9(a) and 10(a) present estimates of the density of log real wage changes for periods with
di¤erent ination rates using the PSID for the US, and the NESPD for Britain (the redesign
of the CPS renders this a less useful exercise for the CPS data). Notice that lower ination
leads to a compression of the lower and, more importantly for our purposes, the upper tail of
the wage change distribution, precisely in accordance with the predictions of section 4.124.
However, one could argue that at least some of the observed di¤erences were due to changes
in other variables that a¤ect wage changes. For example, there have been changes in the
23This follows because ln (W=P ) =  lnW  lnP =  lnW    where  is the rate of ination.
24 It should be noted that the existence of the spike in the lower tail of the real wage change distribution (at
approximately minus the rate of ination) can lead to an overstatement of lower tail compression. However, our
emphasis is on the e¤ects on the upper tail, which are not subject to this problem.
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industrial, age, gender, regional etc. compositions of the workforce in both the US and Britain
over these time periods. So, we should control for factors such as these before attributing
any di¤erences to DNWR. To address this, we introduce a set of micro-level control variables
for each dataset, summarized in Table 2. In particular, we control for changes in micro-level
variables by re-weighting the observed wage change distributions according to the method of
DiNardo, Fortin & Lemieux (1996) (henceforth DFL). To do this, we rst dene a base year,
T for all datasets this will be the nal sample year and re-weight each years observed wage
change distribution to obtain an estimate of what the wage change distribution would have
looked like if the distribution of micro-level characteristics were identical to that at date T . In
particular, if we dene the log wage change as w, micro-level characteristics as x, and the year
of the relevant x distribution as tx, we derive:
f (wt; tx = T ) =
Z
f (wjx) dF (xjtx = T ) =
Z
f (wjx)    dF (xjtx = t) (22)
for all t < T . The key insight of DFL is that this is simply a re-weighted version of the observed
date t wage change distribution, with weights  given by:
 =
dF (xjtx = T )
dF (xjtx = t) =
Pr (tx = T jx)
Pr (tx = tjx) 
Pr (tx = t)
Pr (tx = T )
(23)
where the second equality follows from BayesRule. The conditional probabilities in (23) can
then be estimated simply via a probit model.
Figures 9(b) and 10(b) displays density estimates of the DFL re-weighted distribution of log
real wage changes for di¤erent ination periods, again for the PSID and NESPD. Again, it can
be seen clearly that lower rates of ination are associated with a compression both of tails of
the wage change distribution, in line with the predictions of section 3.2.
However, even having controlled for such factors, it is still not necessarily legitimate to
attribute all the residual di¤erence in the wage change distributions to DNWR. Thus we need
a way of ensuring that only the variation in wage change distributions that varies systematically
with DNWR is attributed. To do this, we estimate regressions of the form:
Pnrt = 0n + 1nP50rt + nt + z
0
rtn + "nrt (24)
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where Pnrt is the nth percentile of the real wage change distribution in region r at time t,
t is the rate of ination at time t and thereby measures the prominence of nominal zero in
the distribution of log real wage changes, and zrt is a vector of aggregate controls that could
potentially a¤ect the distribution of wage changes. P50rt is included on the RHS of (24) in
order to control for changes in the central tendency of the distribution of wage changes. That
is, it re-centresthe distributions over time in order to make them comparable. We estimate
(24) by Least Squares, where we weight by the size of the region at each date.
The measure of ination used will be the CPI-U-X1 series for the US, and the April to
April log change in the Retail Price Index for Great Britain. The aggregate controls will be
as follows. First, we control for any distortion to the wage change distributions caused by
peculiarities of the datasets used. So, to control for the e¤ects of survey redesign issues after
1994 in the CPS, we include a dummy variable that takes value one for all years from 1994
onwards when we estimate (24) for the CPS. In addition, to control for the incomes policies
implemented in 1977 in the UK, we include a dummy that takes value one for the year 1977 in
our NESPD regressions.
In addition, we control for the absolute change in the rate of ination. This is motivated
by the hypothesis that greater ination volatility will yield greater dispersion in relative wages
regardless of the existence of DNWR (see Groshen & Schweitzer, 1999). We also include
both current and lagged regional unemployment rates. This is motivated by the idea that
the existence of DNWR might lead to unemployment  indeed, as mentioned before, this is
one of the principal reasons for interest in the topic. Since unemployment will lead to workers
leavingthe wage change distribution, it is important to control for any resulting distributional
consequences. We also include lagged regional unemployment in accordance with the wage curve
hypothesis of Blanchower & Oswald (1994) that the level of wages is empirically associated with
the level of unemployment. If this is true, then we would expect the change in unemployment
to a¤ect the change in wages, and so we include lagged regional unemployment to control for
this possibility.
It should be noted that the empirical method described above is robust to a number of
possible concerns. First, the specication is robust to the existence of rigidity in real wages.
The reason is that real wage rigidity, in its traditional form, will be invariant to ination by
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denition. An exception to this is the argument put forward by Akerlof, Dickens & Perry (2001)
that real wage rigidity is amplied as ination rises because it becomes optimal for workers to
direct their scarce attention to maintaining their real wage. However, if anything, such a
possibility would work against the claim of the model in section 2, as it would predict that the
upper tail of wage changes would become more compressed as ination rises. If this were the
case, any evidence we nd for the predictions of section 3 could be interpreted as lower bounds
on the true e¤ects. A similar reasoning applies to any concerns one might have about the
impact of skill-biased technical change (SBTC). Under SBTC, we might expect that workers
obtaining high wage increases early in our samples will obtain even higher wage increases later
on as technical change increasingly favors those in skilled sectors. However, since ination is in
practice declining over the sample periods of our data, SBTC would, if anything, work against
the predictions of section 3.
Clearly, the coe¢ cients of interest in (24) for the purposes of estimating the e¤ects of DNWR
are n. In particular, the predictions of section 3.2 indicate that n should be negative for
low percentiles, and positive for high percentiles. The reasoning is that higher ination should
lead to an increased dispersion of wage changes, and thereby decrease negative percentiles, and
increase positive ones.
Recall that we would like to obtain an estimate of the increase in average wage growth due
to DNWR,   E (wjDNWR)   E (wjno DNWR). We show that such an estimate can
be obtained using the estimates obtained from regressions of the form (24). In order to use
this information to get an estimate of , we obtain an estimate of the predicted average wage
change when ination is very low (e.g. 1.3% in 1993 for Britain) and subtract the analogous
average wage change when ination is very high (e.g. 21.8% in 1980 for Britain)25:
^ = E^ (wj = 1:3%; x; z)  E^ (wj = 21:8%; x; z) (25)
To obtain these estimates, we use estimated percentiles from (24) to discretize the distribution
of wage changes. In particular, if we estimate k equi-spaced percentiles of f (w) then a best
25Note that this involves out-of-sample predictions for the US data.
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guess of the predicted average wage change is:
E (wj; x; z)  1
2 (k   1)
k 1X
i=1

P^i + P^i+1

(26)
where i is an ascending index of the percentiles, with i = 1 indicating the lowest percentile,
i = 2 the second lowest etc., and the P^ s are the predicted values of these percentiles obtained
from estimating equation (24). Thus, in this way, we can use percentile regressions to obtain
estimates of the increase in average wage growth due to DNWR. Moreover, since our predicted
percentiles allow us to sketch out a discretization of the whole distribution of wage changes, we
can decompose the increase in average wage growth due to DNWR into two components. The
rst is the increase in average wage growth due to compressed nominal wage cuts, which we refer
to as lower tail losses; the second is the decrease in average wage growth due to compressed
wage increases, upper tail gains. In practice, we will perform this procedure on 99 estimated
wage change percentiles, P^1; P^2; :::; P^99, for each of the three specications detailed above.
The E¤ects of Measurement Error
As mentioned previously, the impact of measurement error on our ability to infer the e¤ects
of DNWR has received substantial attention in the literature. Whilst we have attempted
to mitigate this as a problem by using the relatively clean data in the NESPD for Britain,
the question arises as to the e¤ects of measurement error on the methodology detailed above.
Proposition 6 answers this question:
Proposition 6 If measurement error is independent of the rate of ination, then (i) estimates
of n in (24) report attenuated estimates of the corresponding true e¤ects; (ii) this attenuation
vanishes for su¢ ciently high and low percentiles; and (iii) estimates of  based on (26) will
nonetheless remain consistent.
The intuition for this is quite straightforward26. The existence of measurement error will
render some true negative wage changes to be observed as positive wage changes (and vice
versa). Thus, measurement error will lead to a partial conation of the e¤ects of ination on
the upper tail with those in the lower tail. However, as we proceed further into the tails of the
26 It should be noted, however, that this attenuation result is quite distinct from the traditional attenuation
bias resulting from errors in variables when implementing OLS.
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wage change distribution, the likelihood of measurement error having displaced observations in
this way becomes smaller. Thus, such attenuation will disappear for su¢ ciently high or low
percentiles.
Whilst this result does mean that a certain caution should be a¤orded to our interpretation
of the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cients from (24), the main question we are trying to
answer is a qualitative one: does lower ination compress both the upper and lower tails of the
wage change distribution? To this end, the above attenuation result will actually reduce our
ability to observe any such compression, should it exist. Thus, any evidence of compression we
might nd would be found despite the existence of measurement error, rather than because of
it.
The nal part of Proposition 6 results from the fact that, by denition, the mean of any
random variable can always be expressed as an unweighted average of its percentiles. Since
measurement error is assumed independent of the rate of ination (see Gottschalk, 2004, for
evidence that this is empirically the case), it follows that the observed mean wage change at
any given rate of ination will be una¤ected by the existence of measurement error. Thus, our
estimates of  based on (26) should also be una¤ected by measurement error.
Empirical Results
We estimate (24) in three specications. First, we simply include controls for the median
wage change, P50, and for any dataset peculiarities such as the CPS survey redesign from
1994 onwards and incomes policies of 1977 in the NESPD. We then include controls for the
absolute change in the rate of ination, and for regional current and lagged unemployment rates.
Finally, we implement a specication with full controls that estimates (24) using percentiles of
the DFL re-weighted wage change distributions so we can control for a full array of micro-level
characteristics as well.
The results from estimating our three specications of (24) for each dataset are reported
in Tables 35. First, consider the results obtained for the CPS in Table 3. In all three
specications it can be seen that the estimated impact of ination is negative for the 20th30th
percentiles, with strongest e¤ects around the 30th percentile; and positive for the 40th90th
percentiles, with strong e¤ects in the 60th90th percentiles. Thus, these results are in line with
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the hypothesis that higher ination reduces the compression of both tails of the wage change
distribution. Moreover, we see that the estimated e¤ects of ination at di¤erent points in the
distribution are generally signicant and fairly stable across all specications. In addition,
Table 3 presents estimates of the lower tail losses and upper tail gains due to DNWR. It can be
seen that in all specications there are substantial savings due to compressed wage increases,
some of which even outweigh the costs from compressed wage cuts. In particular, our estimates
broadly conrm the conclusion of Card & Hyslop (1997) that the increase in average wage
growth due to compression in the lower tail is around 1%. However, this is o¤set by savings
from compression of the upper tail of wage changes of around 1  1:5%.
Table 4 reports the analogous estimates for the PSID data. We can see that in all spec-
ications the e¤ect of ination is negative for the 10th20th percentiles, and positive for the
40th90th percentiles. However, here the estimated e¤ects are strongest in the 10th, and par-
ticularly the 20th, percentiles in the lower tail in contrast to the CPS results. The di¤erences
in the lower tail e¤ects between the CPS and PSID results are likely to reect the di¤erences
in the position of nominal zero in the respective wage change distributions, due to higher rates
of ination in the PSID sample period. In the CPS, nominal zero appears mostly between the
20th and 35th percentiles, whereas it appears at around the 10th35th percentile in the PSID
sample. Thus, the point at which DNWR binds di¤ers across these two datasets.
The PSID results are broadly as signicant as those for the CPS, with both lower and
upper tail e¤ects remaining signicant, and fairly stable across specications. In addition, the
coe¢ cient estimates in the upper tail are comparable to those obtained in the CPS results,
and we again observe that there are large savings from the compression of the upper tail. In
particular, we nd an estimated increase in average wage growth due to lower tail losses of around
1   1:2% which is o¤set by a reduction in average wage growth due to upper tail compression
of 0:9   1:1%. It should however be noted that for the PSID, and to some extent the CPS
data, these estimates are constructed from a number of regressions for which no signicant
ination e¤ect was detected. This is likely due to the relative lack of observations and ination
variation in the CPS and PSID compared to the NESPD. Thus, we do not want to place
too much stock in the actual quantitative estimates obtained from this dataset. Rather, we
consider our estimates of upper tail gains and lower tail losses for the PSID to be instructive of
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the fact that there is some signicant compression of the upper tail of wage changes, and that
this compression is of similar signicance and magnitude to the compression of the lower tail
due to DNWR.
The results for the NESPD data are reported in Table 5. Again we observe that ination has
a negative impact on lower percentiles (10th40th) and a positive impact on higher percentiles
(60th90th). Moreover, we obtain highly signicant estimates for almost all percentiles and in
all specications. As mentioned above, this greater signicance in comparison to the results
for the PSID and the CPS is likely to be due to the larger sample sizes, more precise wage
information, and large variation in ination in the NESPD. In addition, we again observe
substantial upper tail gains due to compression of wage increases relative to lower tail losses,
which are more consistent across specications than those obtained for the CPS and the PSID.
In particular, our results suggest that 7694% of the lower tail losses due to DNWR is saved by
restricting wage increases in the upper tail in the NESPD data, and that the increase in average
real wage growth due to DNWR is of the order 0.040.3% much lower than results obtained
previously.
Together, these results provide strong evidence for the prediction that the upper tail of the
wage change distribution will be less dispersed as a result of DNWR in all specications and
for all datasets we see that wage increases become more restricted as ination falls. As a result,
by allowing both the upper and lower tails of the wage change distribution to be a¤ected by
DNWR, the estimated increase in average wage growth due to DNWR becomes much reduced
and closer to zero precisely in line with the predictions of section 3 and Proposition 5. In
fact, we observe that estimates of the increase in average wage growth due to DNWR fall from
around 1% to 0:3% at the most, and may even be negative. Thus, since previous studies have
ignored the e¤ects of DNWR on the upper tail of wage changes, they may well have vastly
overstated the estimated costsdue to DNWR. This, then, goes some way to explaining the
observed weakness of the macroeconomic e¤ects of DNWR found previously in the data.
4.3 Does Higher Turnover Reduce the Compression of Wage Increases?
In addition to the above, recall that section 3.3 established the claim that higher turnover
sectors should act more myopically, will thus feel more at liberty to raise nominal wages, but
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that such an e¤ect should fade as ination rises. We test this hypothesis in a manner similar to
that employed in section 4.2. First, we dene a measure of turnoveras the fraction of workers
that changes jobs each year in a given occupation, region group. In a steady state this should
closely match the fraction of workers who separate, and thus correspond to the parameter  in
section 3.3.
To gain an initial impression for whether such e¤ects exist, Figure 11(a) plots density es-
timates of the nominal wage change distribution for job stayers in high and low turnover (re-
spectively above and below median turnover) occupations using the NESPD data27. It can be
seen from this simple comparison that low turnover occupations seem to be compressing wage
increases much more than high turnover occupations.
However, recall that section 3.3 noted that these e¤ects should be manifested through
changes in the active compression of wage increases, and thus relate to the properties of the
conditional distribution, f ( lnW jW 1). To address this issue, Figure 11(b) replicates the
exercise but controls for the covariates listed in Table 2, as well as the lagged wage28, using
the DFL technique. This allows us to control for any micro-level factors that may be driving
the results, as well to focus on variation in the distribution of wage changes conditional on the
lagged wage. Again, however, we see low turnover occupations compressing wage increases
more than high turnover occupations, consistent with the predictions of section 3.3.
To complete the picture, panels (c) and (d) of Figure 11 attempt to assess whether the e¤ect
of turnover on the distribution of wage changes varies with the rate of ination. It can be seen
that the compression of wage increases due to lower turnover appears to be stronger in periods
of low ination, as predicted by the model of section 2. Together, then, there appears to be
suggestive evidence that the predictions of section 3.3 are supported in the data.
To identify these turnover e¤ects more formally, however, we run Least Squares regressions
27Since tenure is not reported in the CPS, and is subject to changes in denition in the PSID, we concentrate
on the NESPD data for this section.
28 In particular, we use the lagged wage adjusted for ination and productivity growth, ~Wt 1  Wt 1  PT 1Pt 1 
aT 1
at 1 , where as is measured as GDP per hour in year s. This is legitimate provided that DNWR has no impact
on either price or productivity growth. Given Proposition 5 and the results of section 4.2 this does not seem
unreasonable.
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of the form:
Pnort = 0n + 1nP50ort + n ort + nt + n (t   ort) + z0rt n + "nort (27)
where Pnort now refers to the nth percentile of nominal wage changes for job stayers, re-weighted
for micro covariates and the lagged wage, in occupation o, region r, at time t. The variable of
interest is  ort which denotes the fraction of job changers in an occupation, region, year cell.
Under the predictions of section 3.3, we would expect that the coe¢ cients on turnover, n, to be
positive, the coe¢ cients on ination, n, to be positive, and the coe¢ cients on the interaction
term, n, to be negative, for all positive percentiles of nominal wage changes.
Table 6 summarizes these estimates for the 6090th percentiles. In the rst specication
(column 1), we include only basic controls for the median wage change and a dummy for 1977 to
control for the incomes policies of that time, and exclude the rate of ination and its interaction
with turnover. It can be clearly seen that turnover has a positive and highly signicant impact
on the 6090th percentiles of nominal wage changes. The two additional columns address
potential concerns one might have about the simple specication of column (1).
In particular, one concern might be that we would expect sectors with greater DNWR to
have greater rates of turnover due to workers being made unemployed more often. In addition,
we would also expect sectors with greater DNWR to exhibit a greater compression of wage
increases, and thus create downward pressure on percentiles of wage increases. In this sense
there may be an omitted variable the extent of DNWR that will lead to bias in the estimates
of column (1). In particular, it would imply a downward bias to the estimates. Column (2)
seeks to assess this possibility by including the current and lagged regional unemployment rates
as controls. It can be seen, however, that this actually reduces the estimated e¤ects of turnover,
which nevertheless remain positive and highly signicant. Thus, there does not appear to be
strong evidence for an omitted variables problem of this type.
However, we may still be concerned that the measure of turnover is more generally cyclical,
and thus potentially correlated with the rate of ination. Thus we may be worried that we
are attributing to turnover the e¤ects due to declining ination. We may also be concerned
that the e¤ects of ination found in section 4.2 are not robust to the addition of turnover as a
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control. Finally, we would like to assess whether the e¤ect of turnover on the distribution of
wage changes diminishes as ination rises. To address these concerns, specication (3) includes
the rate of ination and the interaction between ination and turnover as regressors. It can be
seen that introducing these controls does not signicantly alter the estimated e¤ects of turnover,
and that the coe¢ cients remain positive and highly signicant. Moreover, we nd that the
e¤ect of ination is robust to the addition of turnover as a control, and remains positive and
highly signicant for all except the 90th percentile of wage changes.
The coe¢ cients on the interaction between turnover and ination are less successful, how-
ever. In particular, the estimates are positive, but close to zero and highly insignicant for the
60th and 70th percentiles. The estimates for the 80th and 90th percentiles are negative and
much larger in magnitude in accordance with the "behavioral" models predictions though
the e¤ect is signicant only at the 80th percentile. However, these latter estimates imply that
a 20% ination rate will reduce the e¤ect of turnover on the distribution of wage changes by
5060%.
We thus nd robust evidence that increased turnover leads to an increased dispersion of
wage increases, that the e¤ects of turnover and ination are mutually robust, and that there
is suggestive evidence that the e¤ects of turnover are reduced as ination rises, broadly in line
with the predictions of section 3.3.
5 Limitations and Future Directions
A number of issues remain in the light of the previous ndings. First consider the theory
presented in section 2. A particular assumption that one might be interested in relaxing is
that of the form of adjustment costs in the e¤ort function caused by nominal wage cuts. In
particular, one might be interested in the implications of a xed adjustment cost whereby e¤ort
falls dramatically for even very small wage cuts. This represents a more di¢ cult theoretical
challenge in the current framework, but has been considered in other applications. In particular,
Degeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser (1999) study a simple two-period model of corporate earnings
management with this xed cost structure. They show that, for intermediate latent earnings
losses, it is optimal for an executive to report no loss, but that for a su¢ ciently low latent
earnings shock, it is optimal to take a bathi.e. to report very low earnings now in order
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to reduce the chances of having to report losses in the future. This di¤ers from the results of
the model of section 2 in that we would expect to see a hole in the density of wage changes
to the left of zero.
A related issue is that one may be interested in more general forms of convexity in wage cuts
in the e¤ort function, especially given the stylized evidence in favour for convexity of the utility
function in losses from the literature on loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Again,
we might expect to observe rms taking a bath in a similar way to that described above.
However, it should be noted that it is not immediately clear on theoretical grounds that such
a convexity in losses should map from workersutility functions into their e¤ort functions. In
particular it will depend on how workersutility depends on e¤ort as well as on wage changes.
Whilst casual observation of the wage change distributions studied in this paper does not seem
to provide strong support to the claim that there is a discontinuity to the left of zero in the
distribution of nominal wage changes, further theoretical and empirical work may be worthwhile
to assess this more formally.
Finally, our theory has neglected the possibility of DNWR motivated by factors other than
worker resistance to wage cuts. Other models of DNWR have been formulated based on the
legal requirement in many countries (notably excluding the US and UK) that wage contracts
may only be renegotiated by mutual consent of the rm and the worker (MacLeod & Malcomson,
1993; Holden, 1994). The current paper does not seek to deny the existence of such motivations,
but merely to draw out and test the implications of behavioral foundations to DNWR. Indeed,
as pointed out in Holden (2004), contract and behavioral motivations may even reinforce one
another in explaining DNWR.
In addition to such theoretical issues, a number of questions arise from the empirical work of
section 4. One such question is whether these ndings can be explained by models of nominal
rigidity other than DNWR. In particular, one may contend that a standard model of menu costs
can explain the observed compression of wage increases in times of low ination. In particular,
Sheshinski & Weiss (1977) show that, in a deterministic price-setting model, increased ination
will result in more extreme price increases as rms increase prices less often to avoid successive
payment of menu costs in high ination environments, when they do increase the price, they
will increase it by more. However, if this were the correct model, we would again expect to
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see holes either side of zero in the density of nominal wage changes, and that these holes would
widen as ination rises. Whilst previous empirical work has found some evidence for menu cost
e¤ects, these e¤ects have only a modest impact on wage changes around zero (Card & Hyslop,
1997), and certainly are not accentuated in times of high ination. Moreover, in a deterministic
setting with positive ination, such as that of Sheshinski & Weiss (1977), rms always want to
increase prices in the absence of menu costs. This no longer holds in an uncertain setting, as
there will be situations in which the rm will wish to cut prices. In this case, it is no longer
clear that the rm wants to set more extreme price increases under high ination to the same
extent. The reason is that higher prices can increase the probability of wanting to cut the price
in the future in an uncertain world, which is also costly in a menu cost setting. So it is by no
means clear on a priori grounds that a menu cost model could explain the results presented in
section 4.
More generally, there is a need in the literature on DNWR for an empirical model that
can conform well with an explicit theory of wage setting as well as with the structure of the
data. In particular, whilst the empirical methods of section 4 allow the data to speak more
by allowing di¤erent e¤ects of ination at di¤erent points in the wage change distribution,
and by assuming nothing about the parametric form of counterfactual wage changes  they
do not provide us with direct estimates that can be related back to a model of wage setting.
However, the current paper seeks to contribute to this process by showing how one can write
down models of wage setting based on worker resistance to wage cuts, and by also providing
empirical evidence that can inform future, more complex, models of DNWR. This will enable
the formulation of more realistic structural models of DNWR that can be successfully estimated
with meaningful parameter estimates.
6 Conclusions
This study seeks to make contributions on two outstanding issues in the literature on DNWR.
In the rst instance, it presents a fully explicit model of wage-setting in the presence of worker
resistance to nominal wage cuts. We show that a key new insight in the context of such
behavioral models is that nominal wage increases become partially irreversible. We then
use this model to attempt to reconcile the remarkably robust micro-level evidence for DNWR
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across datasets and countries, with the weak evidence found for the expected macroeconomic
e¤ects. We show that the previous literature has neglected the fact that the upper tail of the
distribution of wage changes will be compressed in the presence of DNWR. Thus, we argue that
by neglecting these e¤ects, previous studies could have overstated the increase in wage growth,
and hence the expected macroeconomic e¤ects, of DNWR.
Using panel data from the CPS and PSID for the US, and the NESPD for Great Britain,
we nd evidence that the upper tail of the wage change distribution is indeed compressed when
we allow the entire distribution of wage changes to be a¤ected by DNWR. In particular, we
estimate that increased wage growth due to DNWR is an order of magnitude smaller than that
obtained by previous estimates which only allow the lower tail to vary. In this sense, previous
studies could have vastly overstated the wage costs of DNWR.
To further test the model of DNWR based on worker resistance to nominal wage cuts, we
also test the prediction that higher turnover sectors should exhibit a reduced compression of
wage increases as rms act more myopically. Again, we nd robust evidence for this claim
using the NESPD data.
In the light of this evidence, we conclude that the increase in wage pressure due to the
existence of DNWR may not be as large as previously envisaged. However, we have shown
that the evidence on DNWR is consistent with a model in which workers resist nominal wage
cuts along a number of dimensions. Hence, the behavioral implications of DNWR in respect
of the reaction of workers to nominal wage cuts remain signicant.
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8 Appendix
A Lemmas and Proofs
Lemma 1 The value function dened in (5) has the following properties:
v W
 
W;A0

=  cA
0
W
(28)
v0W
 
W;A0

=
A0
W
  1 + 
1 + 
D
 
W;A0

v+W
 
W;A0

= 0
Proof. First, note that standard application of the Envelope Theorem implies:
v W
 
W;A0

= c
A0
W
(29)
v+W
 
W;A0

= 0
It is only slightly less obvious what happens when W 0 = 0, i.e. when the wage is not adjusted.
In this case, W 0 =W and this implies that:
v0
 
W;A0

= A0 ln

W
B0

 W + 
1 + 
Z
v
 
W;A00

dF
 
A00jA0 (30)
It therefore follows that:
v0W
 
W;A0

=
A0
W
  1 + 
1 + 
Z
vW
 
W;A00

dF
 
A00jA0 (31)
Since, by denition D (W;A0)  R vW (W;A00) dF (A00jA0), the statement holds as required.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, note that we can re-write the continuation value condi-
tional on each of the three possible continuation regimes:
v
 
W;A0

=
8<:
v  (W;A0) if A0 < A0l
v0 (W;A0) if A0 2 [A0l; A0u]
v+ (W;A0) if A0 > A0u
(32)
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where superscripts  =0=+ refer to whether the nominal wage is cut, frozen, or raised tomorrow.
Note also that, due to the recursive nature of the problem:
Al  l (W 1) ; Au  u (W 1) (33)
=) A0l  l (W ) ; A0u  u (W )
Thus we can write29:Z
v
 
W;A0

dF
 
A0jA = Z l(W )
0
v 
 
W;A0

dF +
Z u(W )
l(W )
v0
 
W;A0

dF +
Z 1
u(W )
v+
 
W;A0

dF
(34)
Taking derivatives with respect to W and recalling the denition of D (), and noting that,
since v (W;A0) is continuous, it must be that v  (W; l (W )) = v0 (W; l (W )) and v0 (W;u (W )) =
v+ (W;u (W )) yields:
D (W;A) =
Z l(W )
0
v W
 
W;A0

dF +
Z u(W )
l(W )
v0W
 
W;A0

dF +
Z 1
u(W )
v+W
 
W;A0

dF (35)
Finally, using the Envelope conditions in Lemma 1, and substituting into (35) we obtain (10)
in the main text:
D (W;A) =
Z u(W )
l(W )

A0
W
  1

dF  
Z l(W )
0
c
A0
W
dF +

1 + 
Z u(W )
l(W )
D
 
W;A0

dF  (CD) (W;A)
(36)
To verify that C is a contraction mapping over the relevant range(to be dened shortly),
we conrm that Blackwells su¢ cient conditions for a contraction hold here (see Stokey & Lucas,
1989, p.54). First, note that any values for (W;A) that render C unbounded cannot obtain
under optimality, since they will necessarily violate the conditional rst-order condition, (7).
Thus, we can restrict our attention to a subset of values for (W;A) around the optimum for which
C is bounded. This is what we dene as the relevant range. That C then maps the space
of bounded functions into itself over this range holds by denition. Given this, monotonicity
and discounting are straightforward to verify. To verify monotonicity, x (W;A) =
 
W; A

,
and take D^  D. Then note that:Z u( W)
l( W)
D^
 
W;A0

dF
 
A0j A  Z u( W)
l( W)
D
 
W;A0

dF
 
A0j A (37)
=
Z u( W)
l( W)
h
D^( W;A0) D   W;A0i dF  A0j A  0
Since
 
W; A

were arbitrary, it thus follows that C is monotonic in D. To verify discounting,
note that:
[C (D + a)] (W;A) = (CD) (W;A) +

1 + 
a [F (u (W ) jA)  F (l (W ) jA)] (38)
 (CD) (W;A) + 
1 + 
a
Since we know that 1+ < 1 it follows that C is a contraction over the relevant range. It
therefore follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem that C has a unique xed point over
29Henceforth, dFwithout further elaboration is to be taken as dF (A0jA).
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the relevant range.
Proof of Proposition 5. Denote the counterfactual nominal wage at time t as W t = At.
We seek the properties of the di¤erence in average wage growth between the actual (with
DNWR) and counterfactual cases, which we dene as :
T  1
T
t+TX
s=t+1
ln

Ws
Ws 1

  1
T
t+TX
s=t+1
ln

W s
W s 1

(39)
=
1
T

ln

Wt+T
W t+T

  ln

Wt
W t

Then note that, from the optimal wage policy of the rm, (14), it follows that the logdi¤erence
between the actual and counterfactual wages must be bounded:
ln

Wt
W t

2 [  lnu;  ln l] (40)
Thus:
supT =
1
T
[lnu  ln l] = 1
T
lnG (41)
inf T =
1
T
[ln l   lnu] =   1
T
lnG
Therefore, for nite G:
lim
T!1
supT = 0 = lim
T!1
inf T (42)
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) By denition, F (Pn)  n=100. Totally di¤erentiating
yields:
@Pn
@
=
 @F=@
f (w)

w=Pn
(43)
Now, dening measurement error as  with cdf G (), it follows that the cdf of observed wage
changes, w, is given by F (w) =
R
F  (wj) dG () where F  is the cdf of true wage
changes, w  w   . It follows that:
@F
@
=
Z
f (wj) @ (w
)
@
dG () (44)
where f is the pdf of true wage changes. To make the exposition most stark, consider the
following case:
@ (w)
@
=   1 (w > 0) +   1 (w < 0) (45)
where 1 () is the indicator function, and  > 0 and  < 0. In this case, it is straightforward to
show that:
@Pn
@
=   ' (n) +   [1  ' (n)] (46)
where ' (n) =
R1
0 f(wjw)dF (w)R1
 1 f(wjw)dF (w)

w=Pn
2 (0; 1). Thus, the estimates of (24) report a
weighted average of upper and lower tail e¤ects, and are thus attenuated.
(ii) It is also true, however, that as n ! 100 (resp. 0) then ' ! 1 (resp. 0). Therefore,
this attenuation vanishes for both su¢ ciently high and low percentiles.
(iii) Note that, since  is independent of , then E (wj) = E (wj): i.e. the mean
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conditional wage change is una¤ected by measurement error. To complete the proof, note that,
by denition:
E (wj)  1
100
Z
Pndn = E (w
j) (47)
B Technical Details of Proposition 3
The following lemma will turn out to be useful in what follows:
Lemma 2 If lnx  N  ; 2 then it follows that:Z x
x
xdF (x) = exp

+
1
2
2



lnx  

  

  

lnx  

  

(48)
where  () is the c.d.f. of the standard Normal.
Proof. Since x is log-Normally distributed, the p.d.f. of x is given by f (x) = 1x

lnx 


,
where  () is the p.d.f. of the standard Normal. It follows that:Z x
x
xdF (x) =
Z x
x
x
1
x
p
2
exp
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 1
2

lnx  

2#
dx (49)
Dening z  lnx   =) dx = exp (+ z) dz, we obtain:Z x
x
xdF (x) =
Z lnx 
lnx 
1

p
2
exp

+ z   1
22
z2

dz (50)
Completing the square for the term in brackets and substituting back into the former expression:Z x
x
xdF (x) =
Z lnx 
lnx 
1

p
2
exp
"
+
1
2
2   1
2

z   2

2#
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= exp

+
1
2
2



lnx  

  

  

lnx  

  

as required.
B.1 Obtaining the functions D (W;u (W )) and D (W; l (W ))
We proceed by using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. We conjecture that D (W;A) is
of the form:
D (W;A) = 1
A
W
+ 2 (52)
and verify that this will indeed be the case for A = u (W ) or l (W ), using Lemma 2 to solve out
the integrals in (10). Following this method yields30:
D (W;u (W )) = (1 + )
u (W )
W

1   (1 + c) 1
1   (1   1)

  2   2
1  1+ (2   2)
(53)
D (W; l (W )) = (1 + )
l (W )
W

3   (1 + c)1
1   (3   1)

  4   2
1  1+ (4   2)
30Technical details of this derivation are available on request from the author.
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where:
1 = 

1

   lnG  ln (1 + ) + 122   2 =   1    lnG  ln (1 + ) + 122
3 = 

1

 
lnG  ln (1 + ) + 122
   4 =   1  lnG  ln (1 + ) + 122
1 = 

1

   ln (1 + ) + 122   2 =   1    ln (1 + ) + 122 (54)
and we dene G  u(W )l(W ) , the geometric gap between the two trigger values for A.
B.2 Obtaining the functions u (W ) and l (W )
It is now straightforward to solve for the functions u (W ) and l (W ) by substituting the above
(53) into the equations (9) to obtain after some algebra:
u (W ) =
"
1   (1   1)
1  1+ (2   2)
 1
1  c1
#
W (55)
l (W ) =
"
1   (3   1)
1  1+ (4   2)
 1
1 + c  c3
#
W
These two equations clearly depend on G  u(W )l(W ) , which is unknown so far. However, we can
determine G using our expressions for u (W ) and l (W ) above:
u (W )
l (W )
 G = 1 +     (4   2)
1 +     (2   2) 
1   (1   1)
1   (3   1) 
1 + c  c3
1  c1  T (G) (56)
Note that all the terms on the RHS of this equation are functions of G, and not ofW . Obtaining
the relevant value of G requires solving for the xed point(s) of the mapping dened by this
equation. Given the relevant value of G, this implies that the is, i = 1; :::; 4, will be given
constants, as will the coe¢ cients onW in (55), and it follows that u (W ) = uW and l (W ) = lW
as stated in the main text.
B.3 Properties of the Map T (G)
Simulations of the mapping T (G) in (56) reveal that, whilst there always exists at least one
xed point for T (G), there is not, in general, a unique xed point. Thus, in the case where
there exists more than one xed point, we need a criterion for identifying which xed point
value of G maximizes the value function, which is provided by the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Where there exist multiple xed points for the mapping T (G), the wage policy
that maximizes the value function is that associated with G1  min fG : G = T (G)g.
Proof. Dene the multiple xed points of T (G) as G1 < G2 < G3 < :::, and the associated
value functions as v1; v2; v3; :::. We claim that the following must be true:
v1  v2  v3  ::: (57)
To see this, note rst that a higher value of G only serves to restrict the rms choice of W by
widening the region in which wages are not changed. In particular, under a lower value of G,
the rm can always choose a W arbitrarily close to W 1, and hence replicate the wage policy
under a higher G, if it wishes. In general, though, the rm can do better than this under lower
values of G. Thus the statement must hold.
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Figure 1: The Effort Function 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: ( )1|ln −Δ WWf  implied by Theory 
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 Figure 3: Properties of the Optimal Wage Policy Parameters 
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Figure 4: Theoretical ( )1|ln −Δ WWf  for Different Rates of Inflation 
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 Figure 5: ( )Wf lnΔ  Implied by Theory when β=0 
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Simulations of ( )Wf lnΔ  predicted by model of 50,000 worker-firms after 10 periods. 
Parameter values: c = 0.1, β = 0, π = 0.02, σ = 0.15. 
 
 
Figure 6: Overstatement of Costs of DNWR 
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Figure 7: The Dramatic Increase in the Dispersion of Real Wage Changes after CPS 
survey redesign in 1994 (CPS) 
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Notes: 
We measure dispersion by the standard deviation and the 90-10 and 80-20 percentile differentials of log real wage changes.  All measures of 
dispersion are normalised to equal 100 in 1980. 
 
Figure 8: US & UK Inflation over the Sample Periods 
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Source: US CPI data was obtained from http://data.bls.gov.  UK RPI data was obtained from www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase. 
  
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Wage Changes (CPS, PSID, NESPD) 
 
US Data: CPS PSID British Data: NESPD Year 
Π Obs. ΔW=0 Δω<0 Obs. ΔW=0 Δω<0 Π Obs. ΔW=0 Δω<0 
1971 4.4    1,520 10.39 34.41     
1972 3.0    1,527 11.59 32.35     
1973 6.3    1,599 8.88 46.34     
1974 10.0    1,676 8.35 56.74     
1975 8.3    1,733 7.39 42.07     
1976 5.7    1,471 7.48 34.33 18.9 60,318 0.67 41.00 
1977 6.4    1,468 8.65 36.72 17.5 64,838 1.43 77.64 
1978 6.8    1,605 7.35 37.57 7.9 66,168 2.15 33.73 
1979 9.6    1,704 6.51 51.35 10.1 65,619 2.33 38.39 
1980 11.2 25,626 5.70 53.39 1,756 4.38 52.51 21.8 66,574 0.44 46.81 
1981 9.5 28,343 5.79 48.07 1,746 7.22 50.29 12 70,431 2.62 40.53 
1982 6.1 27,426 10.41 45.76 1,664 8.17 38.58 9.4 75,745 3.01 49.34 
1983 4.2 26,521 12.73 45.99 1,606 14.51 44.46 4 77,910 2.06 19.93 
1984 4.3 26,675 12.76 46.29 1,621 12.95 46.33 5.2 75,652 5.09 41.62 
1985 3.6 13,122 12.28 43.72 1,702 11.16 41.07 6.9 75,311 1.69 50.80 
1986 1.9 6,935 13.67 40.63 1,830 15.30 42.51 3 74,487 1.39 18.88 
1987 3.7 27,348 13.68 45.94 1,801 15.16 49.53 4.2 74,848 2.52 24.97 
1988 4.1 26,825 12.59 46.43 1,848 15.42 50.87 3.9 73,440 1.55 20.57 
1989 4.8 26,736 11.99 47.90 1,863 13.96 53.30 8 72,278 2.13 44.91 
1990 5.4 28,045 11.14 49.11 1,815 12.01 54.66 9.4 70,752 2.49 50.33 
1991 4.2 28,688 11.61 46.52 2,441 13.93 49.77 6.4 72,065 2.75 26.40 
1992 3.0 28,521 13.43 44.94 2,441 16.39 45.60 4.3 76,335 4.87 30.87 
1993 3.0 28,468 13.25 45.73    1.3 78,171 6.95 27.91 
1994 2.6 26,584 11.88 44.49    2.6 78,167 6.36 48.14 
1995 2.8 10,227 12.20 45.32    3.3 79,644 5.55 51.37 
1996 3.0 8,458 11.46 44.68    2.4 82,489 1.53 32.31 
1997 2.3 25,386 10.67 41.53    2.4 80,221 1.71 33.52 
1998 1.6 25,255 10.31 38.00    4 76,999 4.08 51.19 
1999 2.2 25,489 9.80 41.02    1.6 77,227 4.38 25.93 
2000 3.4 25,215 9.68 44.19    3 76,806 4.35 39.69 
2001 2.9 24,574 9.32 42.65    1.8 79,689 0.00 32.69 
2002 1.6 26,575 10.32 42.38        
Notes: 
“П” denotes the rate of inflation in a given year.  This is measured by the CPI-U-X1 for the US, and the RPI for the UK. 
“Obs.” Refers to the number of non-missing wage change observations each year. 
“ΔW=0” reports the percentage of nominal wage changes each year that are exactly zero. 
“Δω<0” reports the percentage of real wage cuts implemented each year. 
 
 
  
Table 2: Summary Statistics (CPS, PSID, NESPD) 
 
(a) CPS: Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Change in log real wage 547042 0.025061 0.310781 -5.72642 4.562072 
Age 547042 38.01381 12.52692 16 65 
Female 547042 0.501651 0.499998 0 1 
Education:      
< High School 546516 0.175773 0.380628 0 1 
High School 546516 0.451021 0.497596 0 1 
Some College 546516 0.287882 0.452776 0 1 
College Degree 546516 0.071936 0.258382 0 1 
Advanced Degree 546516 0.013388 0.114931 0 1 
Metropolitan area 521083 0.710509 0.453527 0 1 
Non-white 547042 0.204385 0.403252 0 1 
Self-employed 546877 0.000104 0.010209 0 1 
      
(b) PSID:      
Change in log real wage 33283 0.022087 0.337482 -3.72463 4.619859 
Age 33283 38.24457 11.53739 18 65 
Female 33283 0.196617 0.397446 0 1 
Education:      
0-5 grades 30671 0.036256 0.186929 0 1 
6-8 grades 30671 0.114375 0.318272 0 1 
9-11 grades 30671 0.218382 0.413155 0 1 
12 grades 30671 0.448469 0.497346 0 1 
Some College 30671 0.130253 0.336587 0 1 
College degree 30671 0.040201 0.196433 0 1 
Advanced degree 30671 0.012064 0.109171 0 1 
Tenure:      
[1, 1.5] years 30536 0.092907 0.290306 0 1 
(1.5, 3.5) years 30536 0.204546 0.403376 0 1 
[3.5, 9.5) years 30536 0.354008 0.47822 0 1 
[9.5, 19.5) years  30536 0.236999 0.425249 0 1 
19.5 years + 30536 0.111541 0.314805 0 1 
Self-employed 33257 0.014313 0.118779 0 1 
      
(c) NESPD:      
Change in log real wage 1922184 0.026539 0.190503 -9.9292 9.757886 
Age 1922184 41.01464 11.85092 16 65 
Female 1922184 0.409069 0.491662 0 1 
Major union coverage 1922029 0.426511 0.49457 0 1 
London dummy 1919091 0.144433 0.351528 0 1 
Notes: 
CPS sample also contains 2-digit industry classifications, and 50 regional dummies. 
PSID sample also contains 1-digit industry and 1-digit occupation classifications, and 6 region dummies. 
NESPD sample also contains 2-digit industry and 2-digit occupation classifications, and 10 region dummies.  Major union coverage variable 
does not include more disaggregated union agreements. 
 
 
  
Figure 9: Density Estimates of Log Real Wage Change Distributions (PSID) 
 
a) Without Re-weighting b) With Re-weightingb 
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Notes:  
a. Kernel density estimates using an Epanechnikov kernel, over 250 data points, and a bandwidth of 0.005. 
b. “Re-weighting” refers to the use of the DiNardo, Fortin & Lemieux (1996) re-weighting technique to control for changes in age, age2, 
sex, education, 1-digit industry, 1-digit occupation, region, self employment, and tenure. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Density Estimates of Log Real Wage Change Distributions (NESPD) 
 
a) Without Re-weighting b) With Re-weighting 
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Notes:  
a. Kernel density estimates using an Epanechnikov kernel, over 250 data points, and a bandwidth of 0.005. 
b. “Re-weighting” refers to the use of the DiNardo, Fortin & Lemieux (1996) re-weighting technique to control for changes in age, age2, 
sex, region (including London dummy), 2-digit industry, 2-digit occupation, and major union coverage.  
 
 
  
Table 3: Regressions of Percentiles of Real Wage Changes on the Rate of Inflation and 
  Controls (CPS, 1980 – 2002) 
 
Coefficient on Inflation Ratea Percentile 
No Controlsb Aggregate Controlsc Full Controlsd 
    
10th -0.062 [0.134] 0.06 [0.148] -0.067 [0.151] 
20th -0.254 [0.070]*** -0.157 [0.090]* -0.15 [0.091] 
30th -0.326 [0.074]*** -0.275 [0.074]*** -0.366 [0.068]***
40th 0.04 [0.040] 0.049 [0.043] 0.035 [0.038] 
60th 0.053 [0.024]** 0.053 [0.025]** 0.045 [0.028] 
70th 0.123 [0.050]** 0.123 [0.051]** 0.127 [0.049]** 
80th 0.178 [0.093]* 0.198 [0.100]* 0.154 [0.092] 
90th 0.162 [0.159] 0.262 [0.172] 0.373 [0.131]***
    
Lower Tail 
Losses +0.98% +0.37% 1.10% 
Upper Tail Gains -0.98% -1.45% -1.57% 
↑ in wΔ  due to 
DNWRe 0% -1.07% -0.47% 
Notes: 
a. Reports Least Squares estimates (weighted by region size) of real wage change percentiles on the rate of inflation and controls. 
b. Includes a dummy for the years 1994 onwards to control for the increase in dispersion of real wage changes following introduction of 
CAPI. 
c. As b, but includes additional controls for the absolute change in the rate of inflation, and the contemporaneous and lagged state 
unemployment rate. 
d. As c, but uses real wage change percentiles re-weighted for changes in age, age2, sex, race, region (including metropolitan dummy), 2-
digit industry, education, public sector employment, and self-employment. 
e. Predicted effect on real wage growth of a change in inflation from 22% (maximum NESPD sample inflation, 1980) down to 1.3% 
(minimum NESPD sample inflation, 1993).  Computed from estimation of 99 percentile regressions of the form summarised in the 
Table using the method outlined in the main text. 
f. Standard errors in brackets: robust to non-independence within years.   
g. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
  
Table 4: Regressions of Percentiles of Real Wage Changes on the Rate of Inflation and 
  Controls (PSID, 1971 – 92) 
 
Coefficient on Inflation Ratea Percentile 
No Controls Aggregate Controlsb Full Controlsc 
    
10th -0.228 [0.076]*** -0.227 [0.077]*** -0.236 [0.100]** 
20th -0.596 [0.090]*** -0.57 [0.099]*** -0.585 [0.100]*** 
30th 0.018 [0.034] 0.003 [0.041] -0.026 [0.040] 
40th 0.017 [0.024] 0.016 [0.027] 0.012 [0.030] 
60th 0.029 [0.023] 0.027 [0.027] 0.015 [0.033] 
70th 0.096 [0.047]* 0.11 [0.051]** 0.066 [0.054] 
80th 0.177 [0.074]** 0.173 [0.081]** 0.16 [0.081]* 
90th 0.313 [0.123]** 0.33 [0.122]** 0.301 [0.118]** 
    
Lower Tail 
Losses +1.05% +1.13% +1.18% 
Upper Tail Gains -0.90% -1.11% -1.04% 
↑ in wΔ  due to 
DNWRd +0.15% +0.02% +0.14% 
Notes: 
a. Reports Least Squares estimates (weighted by region size) of real wage change percentiles on the rate of inflation and controls.  
b. Controls for the absolute change in the rate of inflation. 
c. As b, but uses real wage change percentiles re-weighted for changes in age, age2, sex, education, 1-digit industry, 1-digit occupation, 
region, self employment, and tenure. 
d. Predicted effect on real wage growth of a change in inflation from 22% (maximum NESPD sample inflation, 1980) down to 1.3% 
(minimum NESPD sample inflation, 1993).  Computed from estimation of 97 percentile regressions of the form summarised in the 
Table using the method outlined in the main text – bottom and top percentiles are trimmed away as these yield extreme results. 
e. Standard errors in brackets: robust to non-independence within years. 
f. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
  
Table 5: Regressions of Percentiles of Real Wage Changes on the Rate of Inflation and 
  Controls (NESPD, 1976 – 2001) 
 
Coefficient on Inflation Ratea Percentile 
No Controlsb Aggregate Controlsc Full Controlsd 
    
10th -0.138 [0.061]** -0.057 [0.061] -0.103 [0.068] 
20th -0.286 [0.033]*** -0.227 [0.018]*** -0.239 [0.021]*** 
30th -0.197 [0.023]*** -0.149 [0.020]*** -0.143 [0.023]*** 
40th -0.101 [0.016]*** -0.089 [0.016]*** -0.089 [0.011]*** 
60th 0.088 [0.008]*** 0.076 [0.009]*** 0.074 [0.008]*** 
70th 0.165 [0.015]*** 0.147 [0.017]*** 0.148 [0.014]*** 
80th 0.206 [0.028]*** 0.176 [0.027]*** 0.172 [0.023]*** 
90th 0.117 [0.053]** 0.066 [0.047] 0.103 [0.043]** 
    
Lower Tail 
Losses +1.26% +0.71% +1.16% 
Upper Tail 
Gains -0.96% -0.67% -1.04% 
↑ in wΔ  due 
to DNWRe +0.30% +0.04% +0.13% 
Notes: 
a. Reports Least Squares estimates (weighted by region size) of real wage change percentiles on the rate of inflation and controls. 
b. Includes a dummy for the year 1977 to control for the dramatic fall in real wage growth due to the incomes policies implemented in 
the UK at that time. 
c. As b, but includes additional controls for the absolute change in the rate of inflation, and the contemporaneous and lagged regional 
unemployment rate. 
d. As c, but uses real wage change percentiles re-weighted for changes in age, age2, sex, region (including London dummy), 2-digit 
industry, 2-digit occupation, and major union coverage.  
e. Predicted effect on real wage growth of a change in inflation from 22% (maximum NESPD sample inflation, 1980) down to 1.3% 
(minimum NESPD sample inflation, 1993).  Computed from estimation of 99 percentile regressions of the form summarised in the 
Table using the method outlined in the main text. 
f. Standard errors in brackets: robust to non-independence within years.   
g. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
  
Figure 11: Turnover Effects on the Distribution of Log Nominal Wage Changes for  
  Job Stayers (NESPD) 
 
a) Without Re-Weighting b) With Re-Weighting 
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c) Re-Weighted – High Inflation d) Re-Weighted – Low Inflation 
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Notes:  
a. Kernel density estimates using an Epanechnikov kernel, over 250 data points, and a bandwidth of 0.005. 
b. “Re-weighting” refers to the use of the DiNardo, Fortin & Lemieux (1996) re-weighting technique to control for changes in 
adjusted lagged wages, age, age2, sex, region (including London dummy), 2-digit industry, 2-digit occupation, and major union 
coverage.  
c. High turnover refers to occupations for which the fraction of job changers in any given year exceeds the median. 
d. High inflation refers to years for which the inflation rate exceeded 10%. 
 
  
Table 6: Effect of Turnover on Percentiles of Nominal Wage Increases for Job  
  Stayers (NESPD) 
 
(1) (2) (3)c Percentile 
τ τ τ π π*τ 
0.023 0.016 0.011 0.081 0.057 60th 
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.010]*** [0.037] 
0.047 0.032 0.028 0.133 0.024 70th 
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.008]*** [0.020]*** [0.075] 
0.074 0.054 0.066 0.153 -0.2 80th 
[0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.010]*** [0.027]*** [0.102]* 
0.113 0.092 0.116 0.077 -0.29 90th 
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.020]*** [0.064] [0.207] 
Controls 
Median Wage 
Change 
1977 dummy 
(1) + 
Current & 
Lagged 
Regional 
U/E Rates 
(2) + Inflation & Inflation*Turnover 
Notes: 
a. Report Least Squares estimates, weighted by cell (occupation, region, year) size. 
b. Uses nominal wage change percentiles for job stayers, re-weighted for changes in adjusted lagged wage, age, age2, sex, region 
(including London dummy), 2-digit industry, 2-digit occupation, and major union coverage.  
c. Standard errors robust to non-independence within years. 
d. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
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